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ABSTRACT
A major development in the music industries in recent years has
been the rise of ‘unsigned’ or ‘self-releasing’ musicians
(sometimes problematically called ‘DIY musicians’ or
‘independent musicians’) who upload music directly to music
streaming platforms (MSPs). This article examines the distinctive
way in which Chinese MSPs have sought to incorporate such self-
releasing musicians into their platform eco-systems and what it
tells us about the ways in which digital platforms commodify
cultural expression. We show that a remarkable new system has
developed in China, based on evolving dynamics of platform
power and state-business relations, and very high levels of
concentration and integration. Yet the work of independent, self-
releasing musicians is playing a much bigger part in the Chinese
system than in other parts of the world, allowing them to reach
audiences in ways that were not previously possible. Drawing on
critical studies of digital platforms and of the historical
development of the music industries, we show that this apparent
democratisation also represents an incorporation and
commodification of activity that would often previously have
taken place beyond the music industries, in ways that place
constraints on the cultural autonomy of self-releasing musicians.
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There has been increasing interest, in recent social science and humanities research, in
howmore and more domains of social and cultural life have come under the aegis of digi-
tal platforms – a process often known as ‘platformisation’ (Van Dijck et al., 2018). Music
potentially serves as a fascinating example of the platformisation of culture, because in
recent years, a new system of musical distribution and consumption centred on music
streaming platforms (MSPs) has arisen. Following a period of crisis for the music indus-
tries from 2000 to 2015, this new system has enabled a recovery of the recorded music
and publishing industries by providing new flows of revenue from subscriptions and
advertising (Sun, 2018). More than 62% of global revenue from recorded music now
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comes from music streaming (IFPI, 2021), and in many countries, MSPs such as Spotify,
Apple, Amazon, YouTube and Soundcloud offer the main way in which consumers
access recorded music.
While some researchers have begun to consider the platformisation of culture (Nie-
borg & Poell, 2018) and more specifically of music (Prey, 2020), one striking aspect of
this system has not been given any sustained attention. A growing number of indepen-
dent, unsigned or self-releasing musicians can now make their music easily available via
distributors such as Tunecore and CD Baby, or ‘producer-oriented’ platforms such as
Soundcloud and Bandcamp (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2019). As a result, an increasing
amount of music is now made public by musicians that have not signed contracts
with record or music publishing companies, whether the big multinational ‘majors’ (Uni-
versal, Sony andWarner) or small and medium-sized companies. While the vast majority
of time spent on musical consumption, and therefore of recorded music income, is gen-
erated by content licensed to MSPs by record and music publishing companies, a great
deal of the content on these platforms is self-released music. The amount of such self-
released music that is available is growing fast across the world, as we shall see below
– and so is the economic importance of this sector (Mulligan & Jopling, 2020). While
some analysts have discussed the working conditions faced by such musicians (e.g.,
Haynes & Marshall, 2018), the implications of the incorporation of this vast musical
‘surplus’ into the platform system have not been analysed, either by researchers of the
music industries, or by those analysing digital platforms. This incorporation raises poten-
tially illuminating issues about the new and distinctive ways in which digital platforms
are involved in the commodification of culture. In this article, we suggest that this incor-
poration can be understood as a process by which musical creativity that previously
existed outside the system of recorded music is, under platformisation, brought within
that system, with new implications for understanding the power of digital platforms.
The case of China highlights these issues in a particularly stark way, because of the
remarkable degree of concentration and integration in Chinese music markets. In
China, currently the world’s seventh largest market for music (IFPI, 2021) but set to
become much bigger, a unique platformised system has developed out of China’s distinc-
tive music business and culture. There is remarkably little serious critical cultural and
media research published in English on the Chinese music industries, as we show in
our literature review below. Our article, therefore, makes a significant contribution by
examining the distinctive features of the Chinese music industries in general. However,
our main purpose is to analyse the distinctive ways in which Chinese MSPs have incor-
porated self-releasing musicians into the Chinese platform eco-system, and what this says
about dynamics of power, control and commodification in relation to music and expres-
sive culture. To achieve this aim, we draw on theories and perspectives from critical
media, communication and internet studies, platform studies, and in particular those
approaches known as political economy and cultural studies, concerned as they are
with dynamics of power and inequality in relation to culture, the first emphasising econ-
omic, legal and regulatory issues, the second matters of culture, knowledge and identity.
The next section places this analytical framework in the context of existing research,
emphasising the historical importance of ‘reservoirs’ or ‘talent pools’ of musical labour,
many of them operating in ‘proto-markets’ (Toynbee, 2000), which exist alongside, and
feed, a centralised, more fully commodified core. Section 3 provides essential context by
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explaining the rise of self-releasing musicians across the world, and in the Chinese music
industries specifically. Section 4 then examines the distinctive ways in which the two
main Chinese MSPs have incorporated self-releasing musicians, and compares the pol-
itical-economic processes and cultural factors involved.
2. Platformisation, the music industries and musical labour
Drawing on research in software studies, business studies, and political economy, Poell
et al. (2019, p. 1) have defined platformisation as ‘the penetration of the infrastructures,
economic processes, and governmental frameworks of platforms in different economic
sectors and spheres of life’, and drawing on cultural studies, as ‘the reorganisation of cul-
tural practices and imaginations around platforms’. We go beyond existing research on
the platformisation of cultural production (Nieborg & Poell, 2018) on the music indus-
tries and MSPs (Prey, 2020), and on creative and cultural labour (e.g Banks et al., 2013)
by placing platformisation in long-term historical context, and in particular by analysing
what commodification enabled by cultural platforms might mean for the creative auton-
omy of musicians.
In order to understand the significance of how platformisation is affecting musical
labour, we need to consider the system of musical labour that prevailed prior to the rise
of the new musical eco-system centred on streaming platforms. Musical labour, in
much of the world, has long involved workers providing their services to numerous buyers
rather than a single firm. This is also true of many workers in other major cultural indus-
tries such as radio, television, journalism and film, but arguably it is even more the case in
music. As JasonToynbee (2000) showed in a ground-breaking analysis ofmusicians,musi-
cal labour combines dynamics of precariousness and independence or autonomy.1 In pop-
ular music contexts where little formal training or education was required, access to the
means of making and distributing music increased significantly in the twentieth century,
as costs of instrumentation and recording declined, and there was an expansion of leisure
time and income, and an ensuing proliferation of spaces where music was welcome.
Toynbee differentiated two distinct spheres that emerged from these conditions. The
first consisted of local musical scenes and networks, in which (often young) musicians
honed their skills and developed new styles in ‘proto-markets’, commodified to relatively
limited degrees, where commercial impulses were often constrained by factors such as love
of music, romantic ideologies, and the use of music as an expression of solidarity, e.g., in
rock, rap, jazz, reggae and myriad other genres (Toynbee, 2000, pp. 1–33). The second
sphere comprised highly centralised systems of dissemination, in the form of recording
and publishing companies operating at a national and international level, and few-to-
many media (radio, television, cinema, print). The first sphere came to function as a
vast ‘reservoir’ of potential labour for the second sphere, as musicians sought fame and for-
tune in the latter, in spite of the fact that only very few could actually achieve success
(Miège, 1989). This ‘over-supply of human and musical resources’ (Toynbee, 2000,
p. 27) was helpful for capitalist businesses, but they faced the challenge of selecting and
recruiting musicians and styles from the abundant musical activity beyond their sphere,
not knowing which would achieve success in constantly shifting market conditions.
In later work, Matt Stahl (2013) provided a detailed analysis of how contradictions
between autonomy and independence on the one hand, and control and precariousness
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on the other, operated in various historical circumstances in the USA. Building on Toyn-
bee’s combination of political economy and cultural studies analysis, Stahl drew on criti-
cal legal studies and business history to show how, when musicians do subject themselves
to the control of firms and institutions in the second sphere, in return for potential rec-
ognition and financial reward, this usually happens under the aegis of intellectual prop-
erty and contract law regimes, in ways that favour capitalist businesses. Central to this,
according to Stahl, are the recording and publishing contracts that determine royalty
rates and much else, shaped under asymmetrical conditions where rights-holders have
much greater knowledge than contracting musicians, and sustained by complex national
copyright laws, framed according to international copyright treaties and agreements.
Stahl thereby provided a detailed historical account of how Toynbee’s ‘institutional
autonomy’ is structured into the music industries, in ways that are highly problematic
for musical labour.
This critical historical sociology of musical labour has not been adequately updated for
the digital age. In public debate about the impacts of digitalisation of culture, during the
period in which digitalisation seemed to be eroding the power of the ‘legacy’ recording
and publishing industries, through its threat to the artificial scarcity that sustained under-
lying copyright regimes, it seemed to be assumed by some digital optimists that a future
digital system, just over the horizon, would democratise culture by making it possible for
‘a long tail’ of smaller producers to exist alongside the big hits and superstars that domi-
nated sales and income (Anderson, 2014). In an era when much commentary was
focused on ‘user-generated content’, concerns about digital labour during this period
were principally focused for a long time on the ‘free labour’ or ‘unpaid labour’ of
users or ‘prosumers’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2016; see also Anderson, 2014) rather than the
cultural workers who undertook actual production and distribution. As MSPs began
to stabilise music industry revenues, however, a new set of concerns emerged about
the paltry pay-outs to musicians being made by these newly emergent business models
(Dredge, 2013). However, these concerns were expressed mostly in journalism (e.g.,
Pelly, 2018) and most critical research on MSPs was paying (often valuable) attention
to various other issues, such as how MSPs use data to achieve personalisation, which
not only ‘reflects social divisions (between high-value and low-value listeners, for
example) but reinforces and even produces new divisions’ (Prey, 2016, p. 42; see also
Drott, 2018), and how MSP processes of recommendation and curation, notably through
playlists, might be reshaping musical experience and subjectivity (Eriksson & Johansson,
2017). Some analysts offered significant research on how musicians must adapt to, or in
some cases push back against, requirements of platforms in the new digital music econ-
omy, including social media platforms, illuminating how the longstanding requirement
for musicians to act as self-sufficient entrepreneurs was being remade and reinforced in
the contemporary world (Baym, 2018; Haynes & Marshall, 2018). Research that focused
on widespread concerns about musician earnings from MSPs nuanced polemical attacks
on those platforms by pointing to the key role of rights-holders, who retained the lion’s
share of payments from the newMSPs (Hesmondhalgh, 2020); Marshall, 2015; Sinnreich,
2016; Towse, 2020) in ways familiar from previous regimes. But none of these recent
studies of musical labour have paid systematic historicised attention to the structural pol-
itical-economic and cultural issues raised by Toynbee and Stahl, concerning the dialectic
of control and autonomy in the system based on the co-existence or a ‘reservoir’ of
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musical labour (Toynbee’s first sphere) with highly centralised and commodified organ-
isations and technologies (Toynbee’s second sphere). Nor have we found critical research
that examines the political-economic and cultural implications of the increasing
inclusion, or perhaps better incorporation, of independent, self-releasing cultural workers
into the music platform system, at least none that places such an examination in the
longer-term historical context we have offered above. The same is true of an important
parallel literature that deals with the cultural work of creators on video platforms such as
YouTube (Caplan & Gillespie, 2020).
As for the Chinese context that we focus on here, there has been some English-
language research on the music industries in China, but none of it comes close to addres-
sing these dynamics of incorporation and commodification in a historical context. Some
business analysis (e.g., Tang & Lyons, 2016) points to dynamics of integration, such as
Tencent’s important purchase of rights-holder China Music Corporation (which Tang
and Lyons see as horizontal integration, but can just as easily be seen as vertical, in
that it brings together MSP distributors with rights-holders). Shen et al. (2019) provide
the most developed English-language account, tracing the evolution of China’s online
music ecology back to the tightening of copyright law and enforcement in 2011–2014,
leading rapidly to the domination of the BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) internet giants,
reinforced by the growth of mobile technologies. In the absence of powerful incumbents
such as major record companies, and building on a loose though tightening intellectual
property regime that allowed experimentation and innovation, such as integration of
online karaoke into MSPs, the internet giants developed distinctive strategies, including
the ‘musician support projects’ that we analyse below. However, Shen et al.’s science and
technology studies approach is interested primarily in the conditions that allow ‘inno-
vation’, rather than the implications for musical labour and cultural autonomy. Our
approach here is informed by cultural studies and sociological analysis focused on the
implications of these political-economic developments for musical sociality and commu-
nity. Our approach is not to examine the subjectivity of musical workers in detail, though
that is certainly a worthwhile aim. Rather, in the line with the platform studies of van
Dijck, Poell and their colleagues, we examine platform mechanisms to examine the affor-
dances they offer and their impacts on musical workers and cultural autonomy. We
examine platform interfaces, functions and practices, and draw on reports from music
industry and technology online media, supplemented by interviews with product man-
agers and algorithm engineers conducted in China in 2018 and 2020, which were tran-
scribed and analysed.
3. Self-releasing musicians in the platformised music industries
The platformisation of music has brought about a new set of relationships between the
‘reservoir’ or ‘talent pool’ of musicians, and the commercial core where many of them
seek success. In Europe and North America (and much of Latin America), in order to
make their music available across the many MSPs available, and to manage their often
rather meagre revenues, self-releasing musicians make use of a set of companies that
did not really exist until the last twenty years, which tend to call themselves distributors
or label service companies (Cooke, 2018, p. 131). These companies range from compa-
nies such as Tunecore that make their services available to pretty much anyone who
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wishes to use them, to companies such as Ditto, which like record companies offer a
range of distribution and marketing services but unlike those companies allow musicians
to retain ownership of their copyrights (Ingham, 2019). Musicians working with the lat-
ter companies are, therefore, ‘unsigned’ or ‘self-releasing’ but they are not amateurs: they
might be ambitious musicians, keen to establish a large audience and build a career, or
established musicians who no longer wish to work with major or large independent
record companies. These new distributors or label service companies track and collect
publishing revenues on behalf of the songwriters and composers who use them. Mean-
while, self-releasing musicians at different scales, from small to large, gain income
from other sources besides recording, from live music and the sale of merchandise,
and other jobs such as teaching.
As a result of this new system, unsigned or self-releasing musicians have become
increasingly important, in business and in musical terms, across much of the world. Mul-
ligan and Jopling (2020) estimate that what they call the ‘artists direct’ sector amounted
to around 873 million US dollars in 2019 (in recording revenues alone – songwriting rev-
enues are extra). This constitutes a small share (4.1%) of global recorded music revenue,
but the growth rate is very striking and some consider this sector to be ‘the most exciting
and fastest-growing sector to spring out of the music industry’s streaming revolution’
(Ingham, 2019). China ‘is becoming a particularly interesting hotspot’ for this growing
self-releasing or DIY market (Ingham, 2020).
There is a confusing array of terminology in this domain and we need to pause to jus-
tify our use of the term ‘self-releasing’ artists. Often the term ‘independent’ artists is used
to refer to any musician, on no matter what scale, who seeks to bypass rights-holders. The
term ‘artists direct’ seems to be applied to those musicians who do not even use market-
ing services. In any case, the term ‘independent’ can easily be confused in this context
with musicians who are signed to independent record companies. Others, such as Ing-
ham (2019) use the term ‘DIY artists’, though this risks confusion with a particular musi-
cal culture named DIY, which places emphasis ‘on forming and maintaining spaces for
production and distribution which purportedly exist outside of, and are positioned as
oppositional to, the popular music industries’ (Jones, 2019, p. 2), when in fact many
musicians at the first and second levels delineated above have no such oppositional
goals. Faced with this confusing morass of terms, we prefer ‘self-releasing’, which is
more specific than ‘independent’, more inclusive than ‘artists direct’, and less ideologi-
cally loaded than ‘DIY’.
The system that has emerged in China is completely different from this system based
on self-releasing musicians bypassing rights-holders to access MSPs via new digital dis-
tributors and label service companies. There is not only a much greater role of the state in
the music industries in China but also the multinational ‘major’ corporations have never
dominated market share in China to anything like the same degree as elsewhere. While
the three majors (Universal, Sony and Warner) have market shares of 70–80% in many
western countries, in China, they rarely achieve more than 30% of market share in
recording and publishing (An, 2016). Crucially, a situation has arisen in which Chinese
MSPs can be rights owners as well as distributors. The various MSPs operated by just two
major corporations, Tencent and NetEase, dominate the platform space to an even
greater degree than Spotify and Apple Music in the west, especially following the recent
closure of Xiami Music (run by Alibaba) in 2021.
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Even more strikingly, Tencent (though not NetEase) integrates platform control with
rights ownership – by contrast with the west, where Spotify and Apple own no significant
music rights, and the major rights-holding companies hold only very small stakes in plat-
form corporations. This is because the early efforts of the major rights-holding compa-
nies to develop their own music platforms failed (Mulligan, 2015). Apple stepped into the
breach with its iTunes system, but it became clear that the subscription model of MSPs
offered a much more stable basis for musical capitalism, and Swedish company Spotify
was chosen by investors and digital partners (such as Facebook) to lead the way. Internet
giants Apple, Amazon and Google eventually entered into the emerging music platform
market via purchases of tech unicorns, but this could only happen once rights-holding
majors and larger independents, now finally seeing a profitable legal alternative to
‘piracy’, had agreed to license their music to MSPs, though on terms very favourable
to themselves.
In China, by contrast, the Chinese state permitted rights-owning Chinese companies
to develop their ownMSPs. Up until around 2012–2014, a huge mass of unlicensed music
co-existed with licensed music on the still-nascent Chinese MSPs. In the clampdown on
copyright infringement mentioned earlier, MSPs were required to take down all unli-
censed music on their sites, and this favoured those bigger companies that could pay
for licensed music, especially Tencent Music Entertainment (TME) which as we saw
above had purchased a majority stake in a vast rights-holding company, China Music
Corporation (CMC), in 2016. TME is now the largest distributor and music rights
owner in China, with an estimated 90% of copyright market share of Chinese music
copyrights, based on its purchase of the huge copyright assets of CMC (Xuan, 2020).
However, in 2018 came a crucial development that was to lead to a greater degree of
incorporation of unsigned, self-releasing musicians into the platform system than has
been the case in North America and Europe. In that year, in order to limit TME’s market
dominance and facilitate greater platform competition, the NCAC, the National Copy-
right Authority of China, introduced a new regulation. Previously, Chinese MSPs com-
peted on the basis of the exclusive content that each offered – i.e., content available only
on their platforms. The new regulation ‘suggested’ that Chinese MSPs should sublicense
at least 99% of their exclusive content to other platforms.2 This had two consequences.
First, Chinese MSPs came to have mostly the same music as each other – more than
99%. In this respect (though only in this respect), they became more like western plat-
forms, which broadly have the same repertoire as each other, but compete on the basis
of their interfaces, playlists, recommendation algorithms, etc. Second, the 1% of content
still permitted to be exclusive became the main way in which platforms competed. This
often consisted of the work of just a few superstars, but began to generate a huge amount
of streams – around 50% of the total (Pan, 2018).
Chinese MSPs then began to compete to expand repertoire by incorporating self-
releasing musicians. They did so first, from 2014 onwards, by introducing ‘musician sup-
port projects’ (such as Xiami’s ‘Light Seeking Project’) that aimed to draw emerging,
unsigned musicians into the emerging music platform system. The aim was to sign artists
to exclusive deals and develop them as stars. However, around the same time, aiming at
expanding total catalogue, and therefore the 1% exclusive content they were permitted,
Chinese music platforms also launched self-releasing schemes to attract musicians of
all kinds to upload their own content, in a way somewhat similar to how western
INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY 7
platforms such as YouTube and Soundcloud permit anyone with digital access to upload
their music. It is this moment that, we claim, represents a new phase, whereby the crea-
tivity of musicians previously outside the business models of the music industries started
to become incorporated within them.
These self-releasing schemes have grown steadily over the years. On NetEase’s
‘NetEase Cloud Musician’ self-releasing scheme alone, the number of artists had
grown from 20,000 in 2016 to 200,000 in 2020 (Ingham, 2020). In the process, the
relationship between musician support projects and self-releasing schemes has evolved.
Before 2016 musician support projects (e.g., TME’s Mass Innovation and Music Project
and NCM’s Stone Project I) mainly served as talent-hunting campaigns so that platforms
could select some musicians for development as stars. After 2016, while some projects
(such as TME’s Force Project) continued to provide such ‘artist-based’ talent support,
new projects became subservient to self-release schemes which catered to musicians
and were mainly ‘song-based’ publishing and distribution services (interview, October
23, 2020). Both TME and NCM upgraded their self-release schemes (Tencent Musician
and NCM Musician, respectively) by offering self-releasing artists services such as pub-
lishing administration, data management, recommendation and tipping.3 To facilitate
these schemes, the platforms launched related projects offering incentives such as pro-
motional services and financing – such as NCM’s Ladder Project (2018) and TME’s
Galaxy Project (2020) – in order to expand the total catalogue and therefore the 1% exclu-
sive content. Thus, unlike the situation in the west, where digital distributors such as CD
Baby and TuneCore operate independently from MSPs, providing various services to
musicians, digital distribution for self-releasing musicians in China is thoroughly inte-
grated within the Chinese music platform eco-system.
4. Chinese self-release schemes and platform mechanisms
We now analyse how self-release schemes have become strategic and fundamental com-
ponents in the running of MSPs, and how they affect the cultural autonomy of musicians,
in the new conditions of commodification outlined above. The schemes’ declared goal is
to incubate ‘original music’. Often in China the term ‘original’ (原创) is interchangeably
used with ‘indie’ (独立) and it is vital here to clarify, for Chinese and ‘western’ readers
some real problems of terminology and translation, given the fundamental connections
of notions of independence with cultural autonomy (Klein, 2020). ‘Indie’ in the contem-
porary Chinese music context has less to do with the anti-commercial ethos and alterna-
tive networks associated with independent music culture in North America and Europe,
and more with an ideology of cultural entrepreneurialism that emphasises the need for
musicians to forge their own careers (Bennett, 2018). While in Japan and Korea, indie
musicians have tended to adopt cultural-political positions at odds with prevailing neo-
liberal discourses (Jian, 2018, p. 5), such politics are not so much to be found in Chinese
indie music culture which has lost the underground anti-hegemonic ethos of the late
1990s (Qu, 2017). Instead there has been a shift to a highly depoliticised notion of orig-
inality (De Kloet, 2010) and ‘grassroots entrepreneurship’ (Keane, 2007, p. 34). ‘Indie’ or
‘original’ music on MSPs is very much a socio-economic concept, often validated by the
ability of musicians to develop entrepreneurial careers, manage copyrights and to
develop brand identities ‘that generate multiple revenue streams’ (Haynes & Marshall,
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2018, p. 463). Our analysis below therefore explores the degree to which self-releasing
schemes are tied to problematic dynamics of commodification, and how this shapes
‘intrinsic’ notions of the value of music, i.e., notions of value that do not depend upon
‘external validators like the market’ (Haynes & Marshall, 2018, p. 478).
Van Dijck, Poell and de Waal have differentiated three key interacting ‘mechanisms’
by which digital platforms operate: datafication – the ability of platforms to turn into data
aspects of the world not previously quantified; selection – the way that they steer user
interaction though selection or curation of topics, actors, objects, services and so on;
and commodification – the transformation of various elements into services that can
be bought and sold (Van Dijck et al., 2018, pp. 31–48). Following this analytic frame-
work, we compare the self-releasing schemes of the two leading Chinese MSPs, showing
how their datafication practices are conditioned by the specific ways in which these MSPs
seek to commodify the creativity of Chinese musicians, and how this in turn influences
selection and curation strategies, diminishing cultural autonomy in the process.
4.1. TME’s self-releasing scheme: Tencent Musician
TME’s four music platforms are QQ Music (online listening), WeSing (social karaoke),
Kugou Music (short video content) and Kuwo Music (long audio content), forming a
single eco-system. They have over 800 million monthly active users, and own the rights
and licenses to over 30 million songs (Li, 2019). TME’s self-release schemes, previously
available as a service under each platform, were integrated in 2020 as Tencent Musician
on a separate platform, standardising enrolment of music(-ians) and centralising the pro-
duction and distribution of musical content. This centralisation involves a deepening
affiliation with Tencent’s overall platform strategies, and with state control.
We begin with datafication mechanisms. Large quantities of data are generated
regarding demographics, music metadata and user interactions. This data is then used
to test and calculate the amount of exposure each song might get, based on the goal of
producing a ‘pan-entertainment’ experience across the four platforms. Figure 1 shows
that, on the page for the song ‘Green’ on QQ Music, when a user clicks the ‘22 fans
are listening to her audio live’ tab, the user will then be directed to another user’s live
chat room where someone might be singing live or chatting with other users, with
‘Green’ playing in the background. Or, by clicking the ‘karaoke’ tab on the ‘Green’
page, the user is directed to theWeSing page of ‘Green’ (Figure 1) where they can karaoke
alone or with others and watch other users livestreaming ‘Green’ in real time. Similar
inter-platform circulation dynamics also pertain on Kugou and Kuwo. Though NCM
has similar entertainment features, what is distinctive on TME’s platform are the real-
time analytics (Prey, 2018) of users’ music-related entertainment behaviour, which
drive and optimise personalised advertising for TME (Jiang, 2015). Also, as real-time
analytics help ‘infer what a given user’s situation might be, at a given moment in time’
(Drott, 2018, p. 253), TME’s real-time circulation can be used to predict the mood, con-
text and content of music usage among individuals and collectives.
Datafication is deeply connected to commodification (Van Dijck et al., 2018). First of
all, TME’s business model includes two sets of revenues: 30% comes from online music
services (subscription, download, ads and sub-license) and 70% from social entertain-
ment services (‘tipping’ – donations by users – in livestreaming and karaoke) (Dong,
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2021; Xuan, 2020). Chinese streaming platforms do not generate significant subscription
income (and even western services run at a loss). This has pushed TME to emphasise
entertainment functions such as livestreaming, karaoke and short video in order to gen-
erate tipping and ‘gifts’.
This pan-entertainment commodification model affects musical autonomy. Listeners
are easily distracted by such pervasive and interactive functions. Each song no longer
retains its boundary as an independent work but instead functions to spark connections
to other activities, thus affecting the textual and sonic autonomy of songs. Moreover, cul-
tural autonomy, involving tensions with commercialism and state control (Klein, 2020),
is hampered when Tencent Musician systematically pursues cross-sector and govern-
mental collaborations to enlarge its already vast catalogue and to grow its influence. Ten-
cent Musician has launched a series of themed song-writing competition activities,
involving collaboration with the state and governmental organisations. For example,
in 2018 Tencent launched a songwriting competition in collaboration with the Palace
Museum, entitled ‘Ancient Paintings Can Sing’, with strong themes of patriotism and
nationalism. Self-release musicians are increasingly likely to feel compelled towards
such promotional activities. This blurs the ‘clear separation between the creative and
Figure 1. (Left) shows the page for the song ‘Green’ on QQ music. By clicking the ‘karaoke’ tab on this
page, users are directed to the karaoke page (right). 6 September 2020.
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business aspects of making music’ (Klein, 2020, p. 65), thus diminishing self-released
musicians’ autonomy still further.
Datafication and commodification are the basis for MSPs curating the content pro-
vided by self-releasing musicians. Highlighting what is ‘trending’ is one major way to
push certain topics, activities and services (Gillespie, 2016). TME follows a very hierarch-
ical logic of selecting trending charts and artists. First, Tencent Musician releases and dis-
tributes weekly updated official charts to four platforms, based on its algorithmic
interpretation of newly released songs on the platform. These charts then form the
basis of playlists. These rankings and playlists need to compete with the different business
goals of TME platforms, and as a result, self-releasing charts are relatively hidden in
‘Charts’ sections. Even on the music-oriented platform QQ Music where self-releasing
might achieve greater visibility, the charts section still operates as a contested field
where self-released content must compete with established acts. So trending charts prior-
itise popular or mainstream playlists, with the ‘Tencent Musician’ chart only apparent in
the ‘Specialist Charts’ section and shown as having the least popularity. So chart curation
is subject to the ‘tiered governance’ (Caplan & Gillespie, 2020) of TME platforms regard-
ing business orientation and copyright hierarchy. Second, the presentation of artists is
also very hierarchical. In the ‘Musicians’ section under the Music Library tab of the
main page, songs and musicians are organised according to popularity, featuring
major stars and their works and hit songs from recent music reality and TV shows
that Tencent have produced or to which it has exclusive licenses. Thus, TME’s curation
logic reduces the visibility and popularity of self-releasing musicians and associated play-
lists, reflecting the dominance of content owned by the big copyright owners over con-
tent of self-releasing musicians.
4.2. NCM’s self-releasing scheme: NetEase musician
NetEase Cloud Music began in 2013 and launched its self-releasing service NCM Musi-
cian in 2016. The second-largest Chinese MSP corporation after TME, NCM claims to
have attracted over 200,000 self-releasing musicians into NCM Musician (Ingham,
2020), as indicated above. Facing rising costs as a result of having to obtain licenses
from TME due to the 99% sublicense regulation outlined earlier, NCM has developed
its self-release scheme as a central asset and has done so on the basis of an intensively
algorithmically-driven datafication strategy. It emphasises ‘originality’ but in a way
that provides significant constraints on musical autonomy in its selection and
recommendation.
NCM’s datafication strategy differs from TME in that it is more oriented to gathering
data from ordinary users and amateur or semi-professional musicians. NCM Musician
positions itself as a space for unsigned singers and songwriters only, but it accepts
many cover singers, who display limited originality. Though this may affect the repu-
tation of NCM Musician and carries risks of copyright infringement, it increases the
enrolment of NCM musicians because of the low threshold necessary for musician regis-
tration. It also increases the metrics of NCM musicians, because users are more familiar
with cover songs. NCM uses algorithms which appear to have little concern for music
aesthetics. NCM’s Musician Service manager told us: ‘our music evaluation system is
automatic, no need for humans. The operation team will be given a list of selected
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names to decide who and how to promote, but this list is algorithm-decided’ (interview,
23 May, 2018). This dominant algorithmic logic is also evident in music circulation.
NCM’s algorithmic system does not consider factors of music aesthetics but works on
the basis of data about users’ previous behaviour (interview, 23 May, 2018). The perform-
ance of tracks is monitored by an important tool called ‘The Musician Index’, which
measures the behavioural and relational characteristics of musicians, problematically
adopting the ‘reputation metrics’ (Van Dijck et al., 2019) familiar from social media.4
The datafication of music, via coding musicians’ and fans’ behaviours into algorithms
that track and identify ‘high value’ (committed and engaged) artists and ‘high-value’
fans (i.e., those who stay longer) (Prey, 2016, pp. 34–35), enables NCM to monetise
these groups via targeted advertisements in the start-up screen and in comment areas
for songs. The NCM Musician manager told us that ‘the Index is now the fundamental
barometer for us to manage the products, and to determine the depths and means of our
commercial collaboration’ (interview, 23 May, 2018).
NCM’s self-release scheme thus provides a means to compete with TME’s copyright
monopoly. It enables NCM to expand local catalogue and acquire free licenses of song
copyrights. It expands local (i.e., Chinese-language) repertoire which enables greater
engagement with karaoke, cover versions, and livestreaming. But NCM Musician dis-
tinguishes itself from TME by claiming to promote ‘original’ music-making. NCM has
embedded free DAW (digital audio workshop) software in its Musician service and
has set up an official channel to purchase song copyrights. Though musicians can
make money from this, some are concerned about this buy-out deal which they fear
leads to a loss of control of essential music assets, i.e., song copyrights and recording
copyrights, thereby clearly affecting their autonomy. Meanwhile, the sheer size of the
self-releasing population and the amount of ‘user data’ generated out of the datafication
of music on the scheme, means that the proprietary algorithms developed in NCM’s
indexing have become attractive vehicles for capital investment (Drott, 2018, p. 237)
and are currently key assets in NCM’s market valuation. NCM is reported to have
made losses since its launch in 2013, but the emphasis on ‘originality’, Chinese repertoire
and data analytics helped have helped increase the valuation of NCM from $ 3.5 billion in
2018 to $7 billion in 2019 (Li, 2019).
Finally, in terms of content selection, NCM differs markedly from TME by prioritising
the curation of original music. NCM’s personalised recommendation plays an active role
in promoting little-known musicians to users. For example, on its personalised playlists
of 30 recommended songs, the portion of self-released music is larger than on TME’s
equivalent playlists, which need to balance the exposure of different copyrights. Self-
releasing charts are emphasised more than all other charts in the interface. For example,
in the ‘Charts’ section of the NCMmain page, listeners can see a list of ‘trending’ playlists,
featuring original, popular, new releases, local and global playlists, but the ‘Indie Original
Playlist’ is forefronted. Notably, NCM prioritises musical value in curating playlists. They
invite teams of judges (critics, musicians and producers, and music influencers) to evalu-
ate and select 24 ‘original’ songs out of 50 songs released on NetEase in the previous
month. These playlists are not based so much on notions of entrepreneurially-achieved
popularity or of copyright priorities, as is the case with TME (as discussed above), as on
qualities of ‘independence, open-mindedness and humanism’, in the words of NCM
Indie Original Chart’s official explanation of its selection criteria. This less utilitarian
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evaluation of ‘originality’ is distinct from that of TME, in that human curation of music is
valued for its relative autonomy, promoting values of musical quality over those of star-
dom, celebrity and corporate entertainment. With no spotlight on particular stars, while
curating the charts, NCM creates a less hierarchal but ‘vernacular’ community via
themed playlists rather than stardom. NCM, therefore, offers some cultural autonomy
on its platforms, though in somewhat compromised form – for there is little transpar-
ency, with no explanation of the rules and expectations of how the long list of 50
songs is created.
5. Conclusion
Self-releasing schemes in China may appear to permit democratisation but they in fact
provide a basis of commodification and centralisation in what, as we showed earlier, is
an extraordinarily centralised and integrated system.5 Drawing on the way that some
platform studies integrate political economy and cultural studies (cf. Van Dijck et al.,
2018), and supplementing it with insights from Toynbee and Stahl’s historical accounts
of dialectics of precariousness and autonomy in the commodification of music, we have
shown how ‘reservoirs’ of musical labour previously outside the recorded music system
have been incorporated into it by platformisation. TME’s schemes offer a heavily datafied
evaluation of the work of musicians, based on the goal of strengthening its monopoly in
publishing (i.e., composition) copyright ownership, and on a strategy of ‘pan-entertain-
ment’ commodification across its platforms. NCM places a somewhat higher value on
autonomous music making, prioritises self-release charts, and shows some interest in
music quality in making official playlists. But overall, self-releasing schemes end up occu-
pying a relatively marginal space due to copyright hierarchies and competition between
the different ‘sub-platforms’ within the overall platform eco-system. Their purpose is
mainly to expand potentially monetisable content within a platform system marked by
super-abundance.
TME’s ‘pan-entertainment’ datafication generates greater exposure and diversification
of musician revenues, but reduces the autonomy of musicians, positioning them as
sources of automated connectivity and real-time datafication. NCM’s strategy aims to
develop self-releasing as a central asset for nurturing exclusive copyrights and advancing
algorithmic analytics to compete against TME’s domination. But as is the case with
TME’s platforms, NetEase’s comprehensive datafication through indexing transforms
musicians into ‘data subjects’ (Ruppert, 2011) whose identities are subject to the compu-
tational configuration of relationships among musicians, users and the platform. Self-
release schemes, as algorithmic projects of connectivity and datafication, are embedded
in TME’s recentralisation of vertical and horizontal collaboration and NCM’s endeavour
to expand catalogue and capitalisation by investors.
Platform mechanisms affect every musician, but those signed to big record companies
stand to gain more exposure and income, whereas most self-releasing musicians seek
greater control over creation, copyrights, cooperation and curation, only to experience
new ‘platformised’ constraints. Our focus has been on limitations on the cultural auton-
omy of self-releasing musicians, because that is where claims about democratisation have
been most apparent. Of course, some self-releasing musicians are aware of the constraints
imposed by these platforms and there is some space for them to exercise agency. To
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achieve greater cultural autonomy, some are now choosing to work with retailer Band-
camp and distributor Believe Digital (see Section 3), or to circulate their music in less
commercial online spaces such as the Douban Musician Site, which provides only
basic functions such as music uploading, picture and video sharing, and posting about
gigs.
These developments should not be thought of as exotic aberrations from some western
‘norm’. Each geo-regional system has its own peculiar and distinctive paths, and we have
tried to characterise them here using the case of China. Analysis of western dynamics
might similarly focus on how dynamics of supposed democratisation, where hundreds
of thousands of musicians gain access to MSPs such as YouTube, Spotify and Sound-
cloud, serve to incorporate reservoirs of musical labour previously outside the core, or
on its margins, into a datafied, platformised system.
Notes
1. Of course in recent years, work in many sectors, including cultural ones, has moved even
more in this direction of precariousness.
2. In early July of 2021, as part of a more general set of measures concerning China’s tech sec-
tor, China’s competition regulator, the State Administration for Market Regulation,
required Tencent to pay a fine of 500,000 yuan (around $77,150) for its anti-competitive
practices, and to relinquish exclusivity rights on existing catalogue. However, this does
not affect deals formed directly with self-releasing artists, and this latter fact makes clear
the importance of research in this area (Cooke, 2021).
3. Data management provides information about the demographic make-up of audiences,
streams or plays, and revenue musicians gain from ads splits, subscriptions, downloads,
etc. Tipping allows audiences to tip whatever amount of money for songs they like – the tip-
ping income, after platforms take a commission, goes directly to musicians.
4. The behavioural data is based on the amount of engagement of musicians and the time of
listening of fans, as well as the relational data of the interaction between musicians and fans.
Interview, NCM Musician Program manager, August 2018.
5. As mentioned earlier, Xiami closed in 2021. This was the Chinese music platform most
imbued with notions of musical autonomy.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Funding
This work was supported by The 2018 National Social Science Fund of China [grant number: Pro-
ject No 18CD179].
Notes on contributors
Shuwen Qu is the Associate Professor in the School of Journalism and Communication at the Jinan
University. Her research interests include cultural studies, popular music, music technology and
communication. Now she is working on the research projects of the platformization of music
industry and its impacts on the musical experiences [email: qsw313@aliyun.com].
14 S. QU ET AL.
David Hesmondhalgh is Professor of Media, Music and Culture in the school of Media and Com-
munication in Leeds University. His research interest includes digital platforms in the realm of
culture, media studies and the cultural and creative industries [email: d.j.hesmondhalgh@leeds.
ac.uk].
Jian Xiao is the associate professor at School of Media and International Culture, Zhejiang Uni-
versity. She has published a monograph, ‘Punk Culture in Contemporary China’ with Palgrave







An, N. (2016, June 23). Within five years, China will become the largest digital music market of
payed music [五年内, 中国将成为全球最大的付费数字音乐市场]. http://www.idaolue.
com/News/Detail.aspx?id=1465
Anderson, C. (2014). The long tail. Hachette.
Banks, M., Gill, R., & Taylor, S. (2013). Theorizing cultural work. Routledge.
Baym, N. K. (2018). Playing to the crowd. NYU Press.
Bennett, A. (2018). Youth, music and DIY careers. Cultural Sociology, 12(2), 133–139. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1749975518765858
Caplan, R., & Gillespie, T. (2020). Tiered governance and demonetization: The shifting terms of
labor and compensation in the platform economy. Social Media + Society, 6(2),
205630512093663. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120936636
Cooke, C. (2018). Dissecting the digital dollar (2nd ed.). CreateSpace Independent Publishing
Platform.
Cooke, C. (2021). Tencent share price dips as Chinese regulator confirms exclusivity deal ban.
Retrieved July 27, 2021, from https://completemusicupdate.com/article/tencent-share-price-
dips-as-chinese-regulator-confirms-exclusivity-deal-ban/
De Kloet, J. (2010). China with a cut. Amsterdam University Press.
Dong, C. (2021, January 15). Tencent Music‘s secondary listing: slowing growth, how to break the
ceiling? [腾讯音乐二次上市：业绩增速放缓, 如何打破天花板?]. https://xueqiu.com/
4649754500/168887331
Dredge, S. (2013). Spotify vs musicians. Retrieved October 10, 2020, from https://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/29/spotify-vs-musicians-streaming-royalties
Drott, E. (2018). Music as a technology of surveillance. Journal of the Society for American Music,
12(3), 233–267. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752196318000196
Eriksson, M., & Johansson, A. (2017). “Keep smiling!” Time, functionality and intimacy in
Spotify’s featured playlists. Cultural Analysis, 16(1), 67–82.
Gillespie, T. (2016). Trending is trending. In R. Seyfert & J. Roberge (Eds.), Algorithmic cultures
(pp. 52–75). Routledge.
Haynes, J., & Marshall, L. (2018). Beats and tweets: Social media in the careers of independent
musicians. New Media & Society, 20(5), 1973–1993. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444817711404
Hesmondhalgh, D. (2016). Exploitation and media labor. In R. Maxwell (Ed.), The Routledge
Companion to Labor and Media (pp. 30–39). Routledge. https;//doi.org/10.4324/
9780203404119.ch3
Hesmondhalgh, David. (2020). Is music streaming bad for musicians? Problems of evidence and
argument. New Media & Society, 146144482095354. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444820953541
INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY 15
Hesmondhalgh, David, Jones, Ellis, & Rauh, Andreas. (2019). SoundCloud and Bandcamp as
alternative music platforms. Social Media + Society, 5(4), 205630511988342. https://doi.org/
10.1177/2056305119883429
IFPI. (2021). Global music report: Data and analysis for 2020.
Ingham, T. (2019). DIY artists will earn more than $1 billion this year. No wonder the major labels
want their business. Retrieved December 12, 2020, from https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/
features/diy-artists-will-earn-more-than-1-billion-this-year-no-wonder-the-major-labels-
want-their-business-830863/
Ingham, T. (2020). The independent artist market is exploding in China – with NetEase and




Jian, M. (2018). The survival struggle and resistant politics of a DIY music career in East Asia: Case
studies of China and Taiwan. Cultural Sociology, 12(2), 224–240. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1749975518756535
Jiang, J. (2015). Interview with Jiang Jie, Manager of the department of Tencent data platform:
Accurate real-time recommendation is the foundation of Tencent‘s billion yuan advertising
[专访腾讯数据平台部总经理蒋杰：腾讯数十亿广告的基础是精准实时推荐]. Huxiu.
http://www.kejilie.com/huxiu/article/FCB52397A277BCBA9D30DA2C6862ADC6.html
Jones, E. (2019). DIY and popular music: Mapping an ambivalent relationship across three histori-
cal case studies. Popular Music and Society, 44(1), 60–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/03007766.
2019.1671112
Keane, M. (2007). Created in China: The great new leap forward. Routledge.
Klein, B. (2020). Selling out. Bloomsbury Academic.
Li, C. Z. (2019, May 27). Pay rate less than 5% can be profitable, Tencent music can “lie to win”?
[付费率不及5%都能盈利, 腾讯音乐能“躺赢”吗?]. CLS. https://www.cls.cn/detail/350635
Li, T. (2019, September 6). Ali adds 700 million dollar stakes to regenerate NetEase Cloud Music
[阿里7亿美元加注, 网易云音乐回血]. Huxiu. https://m.huxiu.com/article/316858.html
Marshall, L. (2015). “Let’s keep music special. F— Spotify”: On-demand streaming and the con-
troversy over artist royalties. Creative Industries Journal, 8(2), 177–189. https://doi.org/10.
1080/17510694.2015.1096618
Miège, B. (1989). The capitalization of cultural production. International General.
Mulligan, M. (2015). Awakening: the music industry in the digital age. MIDiA.
Mulligan, M., & Jopling, K. (2020). Independent artists: Pathfinding through a pandemic. MiDIA.
Nieborg, D. B., & Poell, T. (2018). The platformization of cultural production: Theorizing the con-
tingent cultural commodity. New Media & Society, 20(11), 4275–4292. https://doi.org/10.1177/
1461444818769694
Pan, WT. (2018). Exclusive copyright to attract users to enter; Direct sign musicians control rec-
ommend (maintain) a premium brand [独家版权吸引用户入驻; 直签音乐人控制厂牌推荐
(维持) 溢价]. Hua Chuang Securities. http://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H3_AP20181224127905
6778_1.pdf
Pelly, L. (2018). Unfree Agents: Spotify pushes an Uber-like model for independent artists. The
Baffler. https://thebaffler.com/downstream/unfree-agents-pelly
Poell, T., Nieborg, D., & van Dijck, J. (2019). Platformisation. Internet Policy Review, 8(4), 1–13.
https://doi.org/10.14763/2019.4.1425
Prey, R. (2016). Musica analytica: The datafication of listening. In R. Nowak (Ed.), Networked
music cultures (pp. 31–48). Palgrave.
Prey, R. (2018). Nothing personal: Algorithmic individuation on music streaming platforms.
Media, Culture & Society, 40(7), 1086–1100. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443717745147
Prey, R. (2020). Locating power in platformization: Music streaming playlists and curatorial
power. Social Media+ Society, 6(2), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120933291
Qu, SW. (2017). The discursive mapping and scene reconstruction of Chinese indie music [中国独
立音乐的话语流变与场景重构]. Literature and Art Studies, 11, 113–126.
16 S. QU ET AL.
Ruppert, E. (2011). Population objects: Interpassive subjects. Sociology, 45(2), 218–233. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0038038510394027
Shen, X., Williams, R., Zheng, S., Liu, Y., Li, Y., & Gerst, M. (2019). Digital online music in China –
A “laboratory” for business experiment. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 139, 235–
249. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2018.10.022
Sinnreich, A. (2016). Slicing the pie: The search for an equitable recorded music industry. In P.
Wikstrom & R. DeFillippi (Eds.), Business and innovation and disruption in the music industry
(pp. 153–174). Edward Elgar.
Stahl, M. (2013). Unfree masters. Duke University Press.
Sun, H. (2018). Digital revolution tamed. Peter Lang Publishing.
Tang, D., & Lyons, R. (2016). An ecosystem lens: Putting China’s digital music industry into focus.
Global Media and China, 1(4), 350–371. https://doi.org/10.1177/2059436416685101
Towse, R. (2020). Dealing with digital: The economic organisation of streamed music. Media,
Culture & Society, 42(7-8), 1461–1478. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0163443720919376
Toynbee, J. (2000). Making popular music. Arnold.
Van Dijck, J., Nieborg, D., & Poell, T. (2019). Reframing platform power. Internet Policy Review, 8
(2), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.14763/2019.2.1414
Van Dijck, J., Poell, T., & De Waal, M. (2018). The platform society. Oxford University Press.
Xuan, Y. (2020, March 17). After the copyright dispute, Tencent Music and NetEase cloud music
“war” burned to independent musicians, live broadcast and other fields [版权之争后,腾讯音乐
与网易云音乐的”战火”烧到独立音乐人、直播等多个领域]. 36Ke. https://www.36kr.com/
p/1725272834049
INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY 17
